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The Meaning of Race in the
DNA Era: Science, History
and the Law
Christian B. Sundquist*

INTRODUCTION

What is "race"? Does the concept of race represent a natural and inevitable
understanding of human difference? Does race have any biological meaning, or is it
merely an artificial construct employed by society and political bodies? If race is the
former, then how can modem society avoid a rebirth of racial eugenics? And yet if
race is an arbitrary tool of social organization without genetic content, then how
should we interpret purported forensic racial determinations based on DNA
analyses?
Race is biology. Race is ancestry. Race is genetic.
The meaning of "race" is constantly questioned yet rarely understood. Early
theories of race assigned social, intellectual, and moral values to perceived
differences among groups of people. The perception that race should be defined in
terms of genetic and biologic difference fueled the "race science" of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, during which time geneticists, physiognomists, eugenicists,
anthropologists and others purported
to find scientific justification for denying equal
1
treatment to non-"white" persons.
Part I of this article thus examines the provenance of the "race" concept. The
categorization of humans into "racial" groups was neither natural nor inevitable.
The initial separation of humans into "racial" categories was understood to simply
reflect inherent biological differences between groups of people. These differences
* Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. I thank
James Gathii, Donna Young, Lenese C. Herbert, Peter Halewood, Timothy Lytton, Stephen Clark,
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Paul Finkelman, Nancy Ota, Maria Grahn-Farley, and David Pratt for their
invaluable advice during the preparation of this article. I also express appreciation to my research
assistants Jennifer Harvey, Tichina Johnson and Rakesh Joshi. Earlier drafts of this article were
presented at the annual conference of the Research Council for Sociology of Law and at an Albany Law
School Symposium regarding "Defining Race."
' See generally WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH (1994).
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supposedly accounted for natural variances in intelligence, morality, and physical
and sexual prowess. As such, these pseudo-biological differences were used to
justify and explain power differentials between "races" of people.
Race is constructed. Race is biologically meaningless. Race is power.

The pseudo-scientific understandings of race supplied by nineteenth-century
geneticists and biologists were applied by Nazi Germany in a manner that shocked
the world. As a result, the concept of race following World War II increasingly was
understood as a socio-political construction with no biological meaning.2 Modem
sociological theories thus uniformly understand race as a social grouping of persons
necessary to preserve unbalanced relationships of power. Part II of this article
examines this post-war refutation of nineteenth-century "race science," as well as the
core assumptions underlying modem racial theory.
Race is phenotype. Race is color. Race is language. Race is citizenship. Race is
class. Race is culture. Race is assimilation. Race is law.

Reducing race to a single critical "essence" is an impossible endeavor. While
one's phenotype and color may contribute to racial categorization, so can one's
national origin, social class and language. As a result, race has a complex social
meaning that depends in part on the prevailing "common understanding and
meaning ' 3 of society. Not-so-antiquated notions of race once deemed Italian, Irish
and Southern European immigrants and their descendants as "non-white" and cursed
with inferior genetic stock.4 These groups eventually obtained "Whiteness" based
on changing social understandings of their assimilatory potential, and the formation
of a racial identity defined in opposition to "Blackness." The elusive nature of race
is similarly illustrated by the conflict between the legal racialization of Middle
Eastern and Mexican persons as "white" during certain historical periods, and the
social racialization of these persons as "non-white" and racially distinct during other
times.

Cf UNESCO AND ITS PROGRAMME III: THE RACE QUESTION 6-7 (1950), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001282/12829leo.pdf (discussing the shift from identifying
biological traits to identifying "any group of people").
3Cf In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878) (No. 104) (setting forth a "common understanding
test"). The test set forth in In re Ah Yup, and followed in many other naturalization cases during the late
nineteenth century, necessarily seeks to reinforce patterns of racial subordination by defining race in a
manner that protects the social position of the racial (white) majority.
4 Cf NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 41-42 (1996) (discussing
that after the vote by

the 1790 U.S. Congress that only "white" persons could be naturalized as citizens, "it was by no means

obvious who was white").
5See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1954) (stating that a person of Mexican descent has the
burden of proving that persons of Mexican descent constitute a separate class distinct from "whites");
United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919, 922 (D. Or. 1925) (holding Armenian person held to be "white"
for naturalization purposes, based on assimilatory potential); In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337, 354-55 (W.D.
Tex. 1897) (holding that Mexican-Americans were "white" for purposes of naturalization); Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex. App. 1930) (treating Mexican-Americans as white).
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Race is subjective. Race is objective. Race is whiteness. Race is blackness. Race is
fixed. Race is malleable. Race is performance.
Race is constantly in flux depending on one's baseline understanding of the
nature of race. I am black according to certain understandings of race, while other
interpretations may render me white. I am Latino, Creole, Egyptian, and "other"
according to some outsider interpretations of race, yet I can also be reduced to
"mixed" by utilizing an alternative understanding of race. Outsider perceptions of
race in turn may change according to my performance of race, and how race is
performed around me.
Race is biology. Race is ancestry. Race is genetic.
Notwithstanding the post-war rejection of a biological interpretation of race,
modem genetic science has increasingly claimed the ability to identify "race"
through the biological analysis of DNA samples. Law enforcement agencies in the
United States and elsewhere analyze individual DNA samples to identify the likely
"race" of a criminal suspect, while courts in the United States increasingly admit
expert testimony stating the statistical probability that a criminal suspect belongs to a
specific race based on such DNA analyses. Such a re-biologicalization of race
clearly contradicts the classical post-war theory of race as a social construct. Part III
of this article examines the contemporary re-interpretation of race as having some
biologically traceable genetic essence.
Race is constructed. Race is biologically meaningless. Race is power.
The claims of modern genetics notwithstanding, race remains a biologically
meaningless concept of human categorization. Race simply has no traceable genetic
essence, and the proliferation of racial DNA testing represents a fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of race rather than the neutral application of
scientific principles. Part IV of this article argues that contemporary genetics has
misapprehended the elusive nature of race in a manner strikingly similar to that of
the nineteenth-century race science.
PART I. EARLY THEORIES OF RACE

In order to analyze race, we must understand what "race" at its most basic level
must mean. Race refers to the grouping of individuals according to some perceived
shared characteristic, experience or history. It is necessary, however, to distinguish
potentially benign references to race, and those racial classifications that assign
purportedly immutable negative or positive attributes and characteristics to each
racial category. For the purposes of this article, when I refer to "race" I am referring
to the latter conception.
A. The Genesis of the "Race" Concept
It is unclear when the first theories of race as a tool for categorization and social
control, were first articulated. There is some merit to the contention that racial
theories separating people into categories, and assigning positive and negative values
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to those categories, were prevalent by the end of the Middle Ages 6 and during the
Renaissance era in England.7 According to one sociologist, "by the fifteenth
century, 'race, and especially skin color, defined the contours of power relationships
. .

.. Biological assumptions that were familiar to a nineteenth-century Cuban

slaveowner would have been recognizable to his fifteenth-century Spanish
counterpart." 8 Further, noted sociologist Howard Winant argues that while "[t]he
Crusades and the Inquisition and the Mediterranean slave trade were important
rehearsals for modem systems of racial differentiation, it should be noted that in
terms of scale and inexorability the race
9 concept only began to attain its familiar
meanings at the end of the middle ages."
The noted German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Liebniz
defined "race" in genetic terms sometime between 1677 and 1686.10 In presenting
his "Egyptian Plan" for world conquest to King Louis XIV of France, Liebniz
suggested creating an army formed from slaves from Africa, Arabia, Canada, and
New Guinea - consisting of Ethiopians, Negroes, Canadians, and Hurons." He
presented persons from these geographic regions as "semi-beasts" and less than
human, in large part to "resolve the contradiction between humanistic universalism
and Christian particularism - by representing non-Christians as nonhuman."' 12 The
racial classification system employed by Liebniz relied on religious distinctions3
(Christian - non-Christian) to justify the enslavement of non-European peoples.'
Religion would continue to play an important role in the development of racial
theory for the next three hundred years.
While Liebniz and others may have advanced elementary racial theories that
depended in part on interpretations of religious doctrine or geography, it does not
appear that a formal racial taxonomy was formulated until 1735. Carolus Linnaeus,
a Swedish biological taxonomist, published Systema Naturae which detailed a new
classification system for what he deemed to be the three kingdoms of nature: the
plant kingdom, the kingdom of stones, and the animal kingdom.' 4 Linnaeus
separated human beings into four distinct categories described by both color and
geographical region: Europeaus (white), Africanus (black), Americanus (red) and

6 See Howard Winant, Race and Race Theory, 26 ANN. REV. SoC. 169, 172 (2000) (labeling racial

categorization as a "European invention" having a common origin with the creation of "European nationstates and empires").
7 See James H. Sweet, The Iberian Roots of American Racist Thought, 54 WM. & MARY Q.
144, 166
(1997) ("[R]ace, and especially skin color, defined the contours of power relationships ....Biological
assumptions that were familiar to a nineteenth-century Cuban slaveowner would have been recognizable
to his fifteenth-century Spanish counterpart."); Alden T. Vaughan & Virginia Mason Vaughan, Before
Othello: Elizabethan Representations of Sub-Saharan Africans, 54 WM. & MARY Q. 19, 21 (1997)
(noting that England set Africans apart as "a special category of humankind"). See generally Emily C.
Bartel, Othello and Africa: PostcolonialismReconsidered, 54 WM. & MARY Q. 45-64 (1997).
8Sweet, supra note 7, at 166.
9See Winant, supra note 6, at 172.
10Peter Fenves, What "Progresses' Has Race-Theory Made Since the Times of Leibniz and Wolff?., in
THE GERMAN INVENTION OF RACE 11, 12-13 (Sara Eigen & Mark J. Larrimore eds., 2006).
'" Id. at 14.
12id.

13Id. at 14-15.
14 See Uppsala Universitet, Linn6 On-Line, Systema Natura - an Epoch-Making Book, http://www.

linnaeus.uu.se/online/animal/1

1.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
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Asiatic (yellow). 5 These categories, similar to modem racial classifications, were
also imbued with personal, mental and physical characteristics. As the table below
demonstrates, Linnaeus believed that whites were gentle, inventive, keen minded and
innovative, American Indians were stubborn and angered easily, Asians were
avaricious6 and easily distracted, while Africans were relaxed, negligent, lazy and
careless: 1
Europeaus

Skin(white); build (muscular); hair (long, flowing), eyes (blue);
disposition (gentle, and inventive)

Americanus

Skin (reddish); build (erect); hair (black, straight, thick); distinct
facial features (wide nostrils); disposition (stubborn and angered
easily)

Asiaticus

Skin (sallow; yellow); hair (black); eyes (dark); disposition
(avaricious and easily distracted)

Africanus

Skin (black); hair (black; frizzled); skin texture (silky); distinct facial
features (nose flat, lips tumid); disposition (relaxed and negligent)

The quad-partite racial division of humans proved to be a lasting and seemingly
fundamental principle of racial taxonomy. As the sociologist William H. Tucker
observes, "[t]he assumption [by Linnaeus] that mental and moral traits were
associated with''race
was to inform many scientific investigations during the next two
7
hundred years."
Inspired in part by the work of Linnaeus, German philosophers began to discuss
race during the late 1700s. Emmanuel Kant, in his Essay on Race, proposed that
there were four races: the White race, the Negro race, the Hun race (Mongol or
Kalmuck), and the Hindu race. 8 Kant later revised his taxonomy by using the
following categories: the noble blond (northern Europe); copper red (America);
black (Senegambia); and olive-yellow (Asian-Indians). 19
Kant's conception of race was clearly biologically based, as he believed that race
was a "real degeneration" within a fixed, permanent species. 2 Kant further argued
that each racial group had traits that were "unalterably sustained by succeeding
2
generations even under change of ecological setting for protracted periods of time."
Similar to Linnaeus, Kant also accorded specific physical, mental and moral traits to
each racial group. As described in Kant's essay On the Different Human Races:
(Whites:) contain all natural motive springs in affects and passions,
all talents, all predispositions to culture and civilization and can

15TUCKER, supra note 1, at 9.
16 CAROLUS LINNAEUS, SYSTEMA NATURAE 20-23 (2d ed. 1758).
17TUCKER, supra note 1, at 9.

18John H. Zammito, Policing Polygeneticism in Germany, 1775 (Kames,) Kant, and Blumenbach, in
THE
GERMAN INVENTION OF RACE, supra note 10, at 35, 42.
9
1 1d.
20
EMMANUEL KANT, ESSAY ON RACE.
21Id.
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obey as well as rule. They are the only ones who constantly
progress toward perfection .... Blacks can become disciplined and
cultivated but never truly civilized . . . . All races will become

exterminated/uprooted (Americans and Blacks cannot govern
themselves. They thus serve only as slaves) only not the Whites.
The stubbornness of Indians in their usages is the reason why they
do not melt down with the Whites into a single people. It is not
good that they intermix. Spanish in Mexico. On the race of Whites,
who have brought about all revolutions in the world. Nomads have
only brought about violent revolutions, not ones that sustain
themselves .... Our (ancient) history of man reliably proceeds only

from the white race.
Kant also maintained that miscegenation would inevitably result in offspring that
inherit traits and phenotypes equally from both parents.
Kant's theory of strict
miscegenation was short-lived and ultimately abandoned, however, when he was
first confronted with the ambiguous and unpredictable nature of race: that a mixture
of a white person
and a "Mongol" did not result, without exception, in a "consistent
24
half-breed.,
The concept of using "race" to account for human variety was a very popular
philosophical and scientific project during this era. Competing with Kant in the
effort to promulgate a uniform theory of race based on the teachings of Linnaeus, the
German medical doctor and physiologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach proposed a
racial classification scheme that endures to this day. Blumenbach felt that any racial
classification scheme would be "very arbitrary indeed both in number and
25
definition," and was strongly against viewing humans as "different species.
Blumenbach observed that there was "almost insensible and indefinable transition
from the pure white skin of the German lady through the yellow, the red, and the
dark nations, to the Ethiopian of the very deepest black" and that while people of
non-European "races" may be different in color, "as a whole they seem to agree in
many things with ourselves. ,,26 Rather, Blumenbach believed that differences in
complexion and phenotype may be caused by climate and protested against theories
of racial superiority or inferiority. 27 This is ironic given that Blumenbach's racial
ideas would come to be regarded as being among the most influential in the
development of modem race theory.
Blumenbach adopted Linnaeus' division of the world into five racial groups, and
in 1781 introduced enduring terminology into the racial lexicon: Caucasian and
Mongoloid. 28 Blumenbach settled on the term "Caucasian" not for any scientific or
anthropological reason, but rather because he felt that white Europeans should be
labeled as Caucasian since he believed the inhabitants of the southern slopes of
22Susan M. Shell, Kant's Conception of a Human Race, in THE GERMAN INVENTION OF RACE, supra
note 10, at 55, 56.
23See Zammito, supra note 18, at 41-42 (describing Kant's conceptualization of "half-breeding").
24 Id. at 42-43.
25
1Id. at 47.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 JOHANN FRIEDRICH BLUMENBACH,

THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TREATISES OF JOHANN FRIEDRICH

BLUMENBACH 264-70 (Thomas Bendyshe trans. & ed., 1865).
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29
Mount Caucasus of modem day Georgia were the most beautiful race of people.

B. Race and the Age of Enlightenment
The racial theories of Blumenbach and other philosophers rose to special
importance during the Age of Enlightenment. The Enlightenment period is
important to understanding the history of the race concept, given that an
understanding of race reflects in large part an understanding of how society accounts
for human differences and similarities. The Aristotelian notion that inequality was
the foundation of the natural order of things, as reflected in the concept of a "great
chain of being," popularized the notion that some people were naturally inferior to
others. 30 As such, "it was but a small step to apply the same concept of hierarchical
ordering within the ranks of humankind.' '
Accordingly, the early theories of race and racial merit provided by Linnaeus,
Kant, Blumenbach and others soon became the basis for acceptable science during
the Enlightenment period.32 Therefore, it is unsurprising that the Enlightenment
philosophies of rationality and empiricism, developed to help understand the larger
world, were applied to the smaller world of racial science. 33 As David Goldberg
states:
Empiricism encouraged the tabulation of perceivable differences
between peoples and from this it deduced their natural differences.
Rationalism proposed initial innate distinctions (especially mental
ones) to explain the perceived behavioural disparities. .

.

.The

emergence of independent scientific domains of anthropology and
biology defined a classificatory order of racial groupings subspecies34 of Homo sapiens - along correlated physical and cultural
matrixes.

The Enlightenment philosophies engendered a shift from a pre-modem
understanding of human identity rooted in religion and the preservation of noble
wealth through biological understandings of lineage, to an understanding of human
identity rooted in race. 35 That said, Keenan Malik thoughtfully explains that the
Enlightenment concepts of reason, rationality and the scientific method, by
themselves, do not allow one to understand human difference in terms of race.
Rather, the Enlightenment beliefs in reason, empiricism and human equality
37 were
difference.
"racial"
purported
of
terms
in
inequality
existing
justify
to
applied
29 Zammito, supra note 18, at 47.
30 TUCKER,supra note 1, at 10.
31Id.
32

Id. at 10-12.
33See KEENAN MALIK, THE MEANING OF RACE 40 (1996) ("'Eighteenth century Europe was the cradle
of modem racism' because 'racism has its foundations' in the Enlightenment 'preoccupation with a
rational universe, nature and aesthetics.').
34DAVID GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF MEANING 28-29 (1993);
see also GEORGE MOSSE, TOWARD THE FINAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN RACISM 1-3 (1978)

(arguing that "Eighteenth century Europe was the cradle of modem racism" due to the "preoccupation
with a rational universe, nature and aesthetics" that characterized the Enlightenment philosophies).
35GOLDBERG, supra note 34, at 24.
36MALIK, supra note 33, at 41.
37
Id.at 41-42.
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The Enlightenment belief in universal human nature and the natural rights idea of
social equality necessarily understood social inequality and human difference as
being irrelevant artificial expressions of feudal, monarchist social structures. The
Enlightenment philosopher David Hume stated, "it is universally acknowledged that
there is great uniformity among the acts of men, in all nations and ages, and human
nature remains still the same in its principles and operations." 38 So then what could
have led Hume to later state that "I am apt to suspect the negroes to be naturally
inferior to the whites" and that "[s]uch a uniform and constant difference [between
'negroes' and 'whites'] could not happen . . . if nature had not made an initial
distinction between these breeds of men"? 3 9 What led Enlightenment and postEnlightenment thinkers to develop a racially-based "exception" to this general
principle of universal human equality?
The call for universal rights by non-propertied social classes clashed with the
strong bourgeoisie notions of capitalism and the free market that displaced the old
order of monarchy and feudalism. The inherent inequality that stemmed from the
private ownership of property led Adam Smith and other thinkers to believe that
there had to be limits and exceptions to "universal equality" in order to protect the
"natural" rights of propertied classes. 40 Indeed, there had been a long-standing preracial feudal tradition to organize society according to kinship and "blood ties."
Entitlement to political power and class position was determined in large part upon
patrilineal descent premised on the transmission of a "common substance" from
41
father to son.
Early theories of "race" ostensibly sought to explain class distinctions in a postfeudal society. The writings of Count Arthur Gobineau in Essays on the Inequality
ofRaces, demonstrate this evolving viewpoint:
It has already been established that every social order is founded
upon three original classes, each of which represents a racial
variety: the nobility, a more or less accurate reflection of the
conquering race; the bourgeoisie composed of mixed stock coming
close to the chief race; and the common people who live in
servitude or at least in a very depressed position. These last belong
to a lower race which came about in the south 42through
miscegenation with the negroes and in the north with Finns.
Race theory filled the void left by feudal hierarchy in explaining class
distinctions, and reconciled the unequal treatment of certain groups of people with
liberalism's embrace of universal equality.
C. Slavery and the Race Concept
The defense of private property as a natural right of humankind necessarily
38 DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 60 (Peter F. Millican ed.,

Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1748).
39 David Hume, Of National Characters, in SELECTED ESSAYS 360 n.120 (Stephen Copley & Andrew
Edgar eds., 1993).
40
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 480 (1789).

41Tessie Liu, Teaching the Differences Among Women from a HistoricalPerspective: Rethinking Race
and Gender as Social Categories, 14 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 265, 270-71 (1991).
42COUNT ARTHUR GOBINEAU, ESSAYS ON THE INEQUALITY OF RACES 120 (1915).
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required a narrower understanding of social equality. The balancing of a person's
natural right to social equality and freedom, on the one hand, and the natural right to
own private property, on the other hand, centered prominently in the defense of
chattel slavery.43 Slavery was seen as a form of private property, and was initially
primarily justified not on grounds of racial inequality per se, but rather on grounds of
to support
economic necessity. 4
Slavery was regarded as a "necessary evil"
45
economic progress and provide opportunities for lower class whites.
Africans were first brought to America around 1619, and Colonial law initiallyV
made no legal distinction between African and European indentured servants.
Both African and European voluntary indentured servants could own property, enter
into contracts, live together, and faced similar criminal punishments. Further, both
African and European servants could eventually pay off their "debt" and obtain
freedom.4 8
As America's economic reliance on free agricultural labor increased,4 9 so did the
need to provide non-economic rationales for the perpetual servitude of Africans. A
strict economic defense of chattel slavery and perpetual servitude became inadequate
to reconcile the enslavement of Africans with the principle of universal equality
recognized in the Declaration of Independence and Christian theology. As a result,
the unequal treatment of African servants increasingly came to be justified on the
basis of religious difference during this period. Religion was utilized to resolve the
conflict between the natural right to property and the natural right to social equality,
as well as, the conflict between religious principles of equality and the enslavement
of humans. Before long, Africans were characterized as non-Christians heathens,
and it became morally and socially appropriate to treat them as slaves and to deny
them a natural right to social equality. Moral and political inequality was therefore
Accordingly, Christianized
distinguished from natural or physical inequality.
Africans were accorded legal rights not available to non-Christian slaves. 50 Slavery
was consequently touted as a means for converting African heathens to
Christianity. 1
Nonetheless, the baptism of African servants, converting them to Christianity,

43 MALIK, supranote 33, at 63.
44 Id. at 62-63.
45 Id. at 67.
46 JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY To FREEDOM 65 (8th ed., Alfred
A.

Knopf
2000) (1947).
47
Id. at 39.
48 See generally id. at 3 8-39.
49 See id. ("England came to realize that white servants were unsatisfactory .... Even with all the means
used to recruit [indentured servants], the supply was still insufficient because the tobacco, rice, and
indigo plantations had an almost insatiable appetite for laborers.").
50 See, e.g., In re Sir Henry Maneringe (1624), reprinted in PAUL FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM
AND BONDAGE: A CASEBOOK 10-11 (Oceana Press & N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law 1986) (allowing a black
person named John Phillip to testify in court because he was "a negro Christened in England"); In re
John Graweere (1641), reprinted in THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE, supra, at 10-11 (permitting
a black servant named Graweere to purchase his son's freedom so that Graweere could raise his son "in
the Christian religion").
51 THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 31 (1997).
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threatened the utility of religion to justify perpetual servitude. 52 One of the first
statutory attempts to maintain a de facto system of African slavery involved an act
by Virginia in 1662 that declared all children born in the colony would acquire the
same legal status as their mother, regardless of whether the children were baptized as
Christians. 53 The Virginia legislature solidified the unequal legal status of African
slaves when it passed a law in 1667 that African "servants" could be baptized as
Christians, but that such "baptism of slaves doth not exempt them from bondage. 5 4
In 1705, the Virginia legislature discarded any religious pretense and declared
Africans no longer occupied the transitional class of indentured servants, but instead
55
were to be considered a form of "fee simple" property.
As the economic and religious rationales for slavery and the unequal treatment of
Africans proved to be inadequate, race theory began focusing once again on the
"natural" inferiority of Africans to justify inequality. "Scientific" validation of these
racial theories employed to justify slavery became increasingly important. Scientific
studies rooted in anatomy, physiology and biology purported to obectively establish
that "[s]lavery ...improved blacks 'in body, mind and morals.'"
The disease of
drapetomania - a condition of the mind that caused African slaves to attempt to
escape enslavement - was scientifically established.
The proposed medical
treatment and preventative remedy for drapetomania called for whites to treat blacks
as children - demonstrating kindness and understanding - under "normal"
circumstances, and to beat and whip blacks if they rebelled until they returned to
their natural and ordinary submissive state of mind.57 Accordingly, "[s]lavery was
viewed as an58 expression of the harmony between natural law and social
organization.
The infamous Dred Scott decision reflects the judiciary's embrace of scientific
theories of racial inequality during this time. 59 In Dred Scott, a slave from Missouri
claimed that he had acquired freedom by virtue of living both in a free state and in a

52 Cf DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 348 (1966) (discussing

the belief that baptism could not change "man's civil state" and that nations exist that "seemed to be born
for slavery").
53 See II WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 170 (Richmond, Samuel
Pleasants
1810), reprinted in THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE, supra note 50, at 16 (providing the text of
the act entitled "Negro women's children to serve according to the condition of the mother"). For an
electronic version of the text of this act, as well as a collection of many other laws of Virginia beginning
with the first session of the state's legislature in 1619, see Hening's Statutes at Large,
http://vagenweb.org/hening/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
54See HENING, supra note 53, at 16.
55See III WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 271 (Richmond, Samuel Pleasants
1812) (listing "An act concerning servants and slaves"), available at Hening's Statutes at Large,
http://vagenweb.org/hening/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2009); see also A LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE
MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD 32-53 (Oxford

Univ. Press 1978) (surveying Virginia's statutes through the colonial period).
56Joel M. Sipress, RelearningRace: Teaching Race as a Social Construction, 30 HIST.TCHR. 175, 17585 (1997).
" Id. at 12.
58 id.
59Scott v. Sanford (DredScott), 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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6
U.S. territory where slavery was prohibited under the Missouri Compromise. 0
Among other important legal and constitutional issues, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that African-Americans, whether enslaved or free, could never become citizens of
61
the United States and thus could not sue or be protected by the U.S. Constitution.
The Court's belief in the natural inferiority of blacks was clearly central to its
analysis:
[African-Americans] had for more than a century before been
regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to
associate with the white race, either in social or political relations;
and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be
reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and
a
treated as an ordinary article
62 of merchandise and traffic, whenever
profit could be made by it.
The Court therefore found that at the time of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution,
as subordinate and inferior class of beings, who ... had no
blacks "were considered
63
rights or privileges."

D. Nineteenth-Century "Race Science"
Even those scientists not associated with the pro-slavery movement in America
came to embrace "race science," issuing scientific findings that blacks were a
biologically separate and inferior sub-human species. Seemingly "genuine" and
around the world came to argue that racial inequality was a
non-biased •6scientists
4
The famed Swiss naturalist Louis Agassiz believed that science
biological fact.
"had the obligation to settle the relative rank among... races." 65 Agassiz thereafter
concluded that the "submissive ...negro [demonstrated] a peculiar indifference to
the advantages afforded by civilized society," and therefore social treatment of
blacks should 66be "guided by a consciousness of the real difference existing between
us and them."
The trend towards understanding race in terms of biological difference and
inferiority is perhaps best exemplified by the phrenology work of American
Dr. Morton purported to provide
physician Dr. Samuel George Morton.6 7
"definitive" empirical evidence of black inferiority, based on his measurement of the
cranial capacities of some eight-hundred human skulls. 68 Unsurprisingly, Dr.
Morton found that the skulls of "Caucasians" had the largest cranial capacity, while
American Indians had smaller skulls, with "Ethiopians" possessing the smallest of

60See Paul Finkelman, Scott v. Sandford: The Court'sMost Dreadful Case andHow it ChangedHistory,

82 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3 (2007), for a more detailed examination of the facts and legal import of the
Dred Scott decision.
61 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 454.
62 Id. at 407.
63 Id. at 404-05.
64TUCKER, supra note 1, at 17.
61Id. at 18.
66 Id.
67 Id.

68 Id.
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skulls. 69 These findings provided scientific validation for theories of non-white
racial inferiority. 70
Phrenologists such as Dr. Morton utilized seemingly unbiased and logical
scientific procedures to verify pre-existing racial conclusions concerning black
inferiority and white superiority. 71 In particular, the pseudo-scientific findings of
phrenologists were used to conclude that blacks were not only a "lower" race, but a
completely distinct species that were incapable of abstract reasoning. 72 Accordingly,
slavery was justified as permitting blacks to achieve their "greatest perfection," as
they were biologically
incapable of becoming educated, contributing members of
73
free society.
Phrenologists were joined by anthropometrists in their fervor to scientifically
validate slavery and a race theory founded upon black inferiority.7 4 The science of
anthropometry seeks to measure human physical differences in order to better
understand human variation. 75 As applied to the race context, anthropometrists of
this time sought to examine the bodies of blacks to isolate key morphological
differences from whites. 76 Using measurements of whites as the default standard of
perfection, anthropometrists sought to interpret any anatomical differences in racial
terms. 77 The anthropometrists of the nineteenth century made outlandish claims,
such as "the hair of the white man is more perfect than78that of the negro," and the
small facial angle of blacks indicated lower intelligence.
E. "Social Darwinism," Evolution and Race Theory
While ethnologists and phrenologists were searching for scientific validation for
their pre-formed views of black inferiority, Charles Darwin's theory of evolution
revolutionized biological study.79 Prior to Darwin's publication of The Origin of
Species, race theory focused on three key schools of thought to cultivate an ideology
of black inferiority: the Aristotelian notion of a "great chain of being," religious
difference, and the polygenic focus on assigning physical and mental values to
supposed morphological difference. Darwin's theory of evolution unwittingly
became the fourth
key vehicle for scientifically demonstrating white superiority and
80
black inferiority.
Darwin accounted for variation in the natural world based on a theory of gradual
evolution within a species pursuant to a process of natural selection. 8 Nonetheless,
Darwin anticipated the potential social application of his evolutionary theory to race,
and explicitly stated that all "races" of humans belonged to the same species:
69 TUCKER, supra note 1, at 18.
70 GOSSETT, supra note 51, at 73-75.

71TUCKER, supra note 1, at 20-21.
72Id.
73Id.
74id.

75See generally GOSSETT, supra note 51, at 54-83.
76TUCKER, supra note 1, at 22-25.
77Id.
78

Id. at 23.
79 Id. at 25.
80 See id. at 26-29 (discussing Darwin's theory and its eventual application to races).
81TUCKER, supra note 1, at 25-26.
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Although the existing races of man differ in many respects as in
color, hair, shape of skull, proportions of the body, etc., yet if their
whole structure be taken into consideration they are found to
resemble each other closely in a multitude of points. Many of these
are so unimportant or of so singular a nature that it is extremely
improbable that they should have been
independently acquired by
82
aboriginally distinct species or races.
Darwin believed that the "races of man" differed in physical anatomy, and was
undoubtedly influenced by the anthropometrists and phrenologists of his time.
However, Darwin was careful not to designate where the "races" fell on the
evolutionary ladder, if at all.
Nonetheless, Darwin's theories of biological evolution and natural selection were
co-opted to explain human differences in terms of race. 83 The "Social Darwinist"
school of thought, founded in part by Herbert Spencer, sought to apply Darwin's
evolutionary theory to explain (and justify) racial and class inequality. 84 Social
Darwinists thus latched upon the catch phrase of "survival of the fittest" to argue that
the suffering of lesser-evolved classes of people is the necessary price for
evolutionary progress. 85 As such, Social Darwinists believed that all efforts to
eliminate existing social inequality would only frustrate nature's evolutionary plan.
Competition between individuals is necessary in order to fetter out undesirable and
inferior biological traits.86 As applied to the class context, Social Darwinists
opposed all government and private intervention designed to assist the poor,
including minimum wage legislation, free public education, and charitable aid to the
needy. Rather, Social Darwinists believed society should advance
the ideals of
87
capitalism and free competition in order to abide by nature's laws.
Noted jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes even took the Supreme Court to task for
relying on the laissez faire theories of Herbert Spencer when deciding the infamous
Lochner v. New York case. 88 In Lochner, the Court struck down a New York labor
regulation that limited the number of hours bakers could work.89 The Court held that
the statute interfered with the freedom of employers to contract for the labor of
employees, thereby violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 90 Justice Holmes dissented from the majority holding, believing that
the decision was "decided upon an economic theory" of laissez faire and
admonishing the majority that "[t]he Fourteenth] Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics [sic].
Social Darwinism also conveniently resolved the inherent contradiction between
82 CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 231-32
(London,

Murray 1871), available at The Complete Work of Charles Darwin Online, http://darwin-online.org.uk
/content/frameset?itemlD=F937.1 &viewtype=side&pageseq-l (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
83 TUCKER, supra note 1, at 29.
84 Id. at 26-28.
85 Id.
86

Id.at 27.

87 id.

88Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
89 Id. at 64.
90

Id. at 53.

91 Id. at 75.
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the Enlightenment principle of equality and existing class and racial inequality.
According to Social Darwinists, people suffering from social inequality were
necessarily genetically inferior and thus not equal to the ruling class. The principle
of democratic equality, then, applied only to biological equals.
The concept of "survival of the fittest" was soon extended to race theory. The
different "races" were believed to represent different positions on the evolutionary
ladder.
Armed with scientific evidence provided by physiognomists and
anthropologists, Social Darwinism unsurprisingly viewed the white race as
occupying the highest state of human evolution, while non-white races remained in a
lower stage of evolution. As one Social Darwinist stated, there was "one way, and
one way only, in which a high state of civilization has been produced, namely the
struggle of race with race and the survival of the physically and mentally fitter
race." 92 Social Darwinism thus pitted race against race in the struggle for
evolutionary survival, and viewed domination
and oppression over "inferior races"
93
to be the only method to improve society.
The skewed reasoning of Social Darwinism led to one conclusion as to how to
resolve the "race problem": eliminate the biologically inferior races from the genetic
pool. 94 The extermination of inferior races, namely the black race, was coldly
regarded as an inevitable expression of natural law: "If [blacks] were the highest
form of human life, we might be concerned . . . . [But] to the clear, cold eye of
science, the plight of these backward peoples appears practically hopeless. They
have neither part nor parcel in the future history of man."
Miscegenation also posed a threat to evolutionary progress. According to Social
Darwinists, such mixtures would always lead to biological denigration:
The consequence is that, if you mix the constitutions of two widely
divergent varieties which have severally become adapted to widely
divergent modes of life, you get a constitution which is adapted to
the mode of life of neither- a constitution which will not work
properly, 96because it is not fitted for any set of conditions
whatever.
Nonetheless, the mixture of the various strains of the "Aryan race," was regarded as
a laudable evolutionary goal that would "produce a more powerful type of man than
has hitherto existed .... I think ... the Americans may reasonably look forward to a
time when
they will have produced a civilization grander than any the world has
97
known."
F. The Eugenics Movement
Social Darwinism encouraged many scientists to attempt to improve society by
subtly "guiding" the natural evolutionary process. Francis Galton, a cousin of
92 TUCKER,

supra note 1, at 29 (quoting Karl Pearson).

93 Id.

Id. at 29-34.
95Id. at 31 (quoting William Benjamin Smith, a professor at Tulane University in 1905).
96 GOSSETT, supra note 51, at 151 (quoting Letter from Herbert Spencer to Kentaro Kaneko (Aug.
26,
94

1892), in 2 DAVID DUNCAN, LIFE AND LETTERS OF HERBERT SPENCER 17 (D. Appleton and Co. 1908)).
97 Id. (quoting EDWARD LIVINGSTON YOUMANS, HERBERT SPENCER ON THE AMERICANS AND THE

AMERICANS ON HERBERT SPENCER 19-20 (D. Appleton and Co. 1883)).
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Charles Darwin and influenced by the teachings of Social Darwinism, coined the
term "eugenics" to refer to the scientific promotion of superior genetic, hereditary
traits. Galton believed that science could promote the development of a perfect
"human race" by encouraging the transmission of superior genetic "stock" and
inhibiting the transmission of inferior genetic "stock."
The eugenicists sought to develop scientific measures of innate ability and
intelligence to support their claims that heredity determined genetic potential.
Relying on the law of deviation from an average, Galton and other eugenicists
developed various statistical measures of intellectual ability that purported to
determine human "merit." Utilizing a "normal curve" of distribution, Galton found
that blacks scored two grades lower than whites on intelligence tests. 98 According to
Galton, it was obvious that 99
the majority of blacks were "half-witted" and thus
biologically inferior to whites.
Galton was one of the first scientists to theorize that intelligence was
scientifically quantifiable and normally distributed along a statistical bell curve.
Psychologists aided in developing mental tests that replaced the anthropometric
measurements of the past. These mental tests were regarded as being able to
scientifically and rationally determine human worth. Mental tests soon became
psychology's principal scientific method largely due to the field's alliance with the
eugenicist movement. That these purportedly neutral tests were tainted by racial bias
is almost too obvious to mention. As the sociologist William Tucker recounts:
Even before data from the new mental tests had been gathered,
many social scientists had already made up their mind about the
intelligence of blacks and immigrants. . . . Indeed, had the data
conflicted with already received opinion, the new instruments
would probably have been invalidated as measures of intelligence
and discarded; some earlier tests of ability had already suffered
such
100
a fate when they failed to yield the expected racial ordering.
The eugenicist movement also sought to provide scientific support for existing
legal rules of hypodescent. Eugenicists believed that a racial hybrid always resulted
in a biological degeneration, and exhibited the genetic stock of the parent from the
inferior race. As such, eugenicists believed:
The cross between a white man and an Indian is an Indian; the cross
between a white man and a Negro is a Negro, the cross between a
white man and a Hindu is a Hindu; and the
cross between any of the
10
three European races and a Jew is a Jew.
In many ways, the Social Darwinist movement inspired the eugenicist movement
to apply pre-existing principles of animal husbandry to humans. Indeed, one of the
most important early eugenicist organizations was called the "American Breeders'
Association," whose name was later changed to the American Genetic
Association.
the eugenicist
movement
focused onprograms
human for
breeding
programs for thoseThus,
with superior
racial genetics
and sterilization
those

98TUCKER, supra note 1, at 43.
99GOSSETT, supra note 51, at 156.
0oTUCKER, supra note 1, at 74-75.
O'Id. at 90 (quoting MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE 18 (1923)).
102Id. at 62.
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with inferior genetics. Galton concluded that heredity, as informed by Social
Darwinism, made it "quite practicable to produce a highly gifted race of men by
judicious marriages during several consecutive generations." 10 3 Such "judicious
marriages" could be achieved by compiling and publishing "a 'golden book' of
natural nobility,"10 4listing those members of society with superior heredity so that they
may intermarry.
Eugenicists claimed that inferior genetic material from southern and eastern
European immigrants, blacks, and "degenerates" posed the greatest threat to the
propagation of superior stock. Unsurprisingly, eugenicists supported immigration
restrictions, anti-miscegenation laws, Jim Crow policies, and forced sterilization
policies in the United States. According to conservative estimates, over forty-five
thousand individuals were sterilized
in thirty states pursuant to state statutes aimed at
"socially inadequate" persons. 105
G. Immigration, Assimilation, Whiteness and the Race Concept
The racial theories of Social Darwinism and eugenics were invoked to buttress

arguments for the restricted immigration of persons of "inferior stock" to the United
States. The Chinese were the initial targets for the new found xenophobia of the late
nineteenth century. In particular, California amended its state constitution in 1879 to
declare Chinese people "a menace" to the state, and called for measures aimed at the
"burdens and evils arising from the presence of aliens."' 10 6 The amendment, which
prohibited the employment of Chinese, stemmed from
growing concern that Chinese
to whites.10 7

laborers were causing economic hardship
Congress eventually passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which excluded
new Chinese immigrants from entering the United States and required Chinese
immigrants already residing in the United States to obtain special certificates of
employment.' 0 8 While concerns of economic competition were cited as partial
justification for restrictive immigration, the exclusion of Chinese persons from the
United States was principally aimed at maintaining a northern-European-inspired

"American" identity and population. 10 9 The legislative history of the Act
demonstrates that Congress was principally concerned with protecting the "AngloSaxon" race and culture. 10 Senator Salsbury proclaimed that he:
Would not close the gates against the immigration of the Chinese to
103 Id. at 46 (quoting FRANCIS GALTON, HEREDITARY GENIUS: AN INQUIRY INTO ITS LAWS AND

CONSEQUENCES 1 (London, MacMillan 1869), available at http://galton.org/books/hereditary-genius
/ga1ton- 1869-Hereditary-Genius.pdf).
Id. at 47.
105TUCKER, supra note 1, at 61.
106CAL. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (repealed 1952).
107The prohibition of Chinese labor included in the amended California Constitution was invalidated a
ear later. See In re Tiburcio Parrot, 1 F. 481, 518 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880).
. See Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 58-61 (repealed 1943) (stating further that
Chinese immigrants living in the United States could re-enter the United States if they traveled abroad,
provided they had valid re-entry certificates); see also Scott Act, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (repealed
1943) (providing for the permanent exclusion of Chinese immigrants and declaring re-entry certificates
to be void).
109Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation'sLast Stranglehold: Race Discriminationand the ConstitutionalLaw of
Immigration, 46 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1, 28-29 (1998).
110 Id.
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this country simply upon the ground that they enter into competition
with labor, but I put it upon another ground, which is that it
introduces a distinct race of people with a different civilization from
that which we are accustomed, wholly incapable of assimilation
with our people. In my opinion, their presence among us will not
improve their condition morally or in any other respect ... while it
may lead to discord 11
and possible collision with the Anglo-Saxon
live.
they
among
race
Race and whiteness were framed not only in terms of genetic superiority and
evolutionary potential, but also in terms of assimilatory potential. The U.S. Supreme
Court relied on these race concepts when it upheld the constitutionality of the
Chinese Exclusion Act in Chae Chan Ping v. United States.liE In upholding the Act,
the Court stressed that the immigration restrictions were necessary to the
"preservation of our civilization," and that without such measures the country
"would be overrun by [Chinese immigrant laborers]." ' 1 3 In particular, the Court
found that it was "impossible for them to assimilate with our people" due to the
"differences of race." I
The United States also experienced a tremendous increase in immigration from
eastern and southern European countries during the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century. These immigrants, including the Irish, Jews and Italians, were
initially characterized as non-white and biologically inferior. The Social Darwinists
and eugenicists did not limit their genetic inquiry to members of the "Negroid" or
"Mongoloid" races, but also believed that genetic differentiation could be made with
respect to the varieties of the "Caucasoid" race. The new European immigrants were
regarded as being genetically inferior to northern Europeans, and thus a threat to the
genetic purity of Americans. Indeed, a prevailing view at the end of the nineteenth
century was that "the best remedy for whatever is amiss
in America would be if
5
every Irishman would kill a negro and be hanged for it.""
Accordingly, the eugenicists supported the use of mental tests to exclude inferior
immigrants from entering the United States. By 1911, eugenicists received
permission to visit Ellis Island in order to administer intelligence tests to incoming
immigrants."
Unsurprisingly, the tests verified the eugenicists' pre-existing racial
beliefs that the vast majority of southern and eastern European immigrants were
"feebleminded" and thus deportable. 117
The anti-immigrant fervor eventually led Congress to pass the National Origins

It Id. (quoting 13 CONG. REC. 1584 (1882)).

130 U.S. 581 (1889).
3
..
Id. at 594-95.

114 Id. at

595.

I5 TUCKER, supra note 1, at 34 (quoting Oxford University professor Edward A. Freeman).
6 Id. at 78. "An accurate measurement of every one's intelligence would seem to herald the feasibility

of selecting better endowed persons for admission into citizenship - and even for the right of having
offspring." Id. at 73 (quoting Charles Spearman).
117 Id. at 78, 81. The eugenicists concluded that "83 percent of Jews, 80 percent of
Hungarians, and 79
percent of Russians were feebleminded" and thus deportable. The mental tests developed by eugenicists
were also administered to soldiers in the U.S. Army around 1920. Id. at 79-81. Once again, the results
of the tests indicated that northern Europeans scored the highest, while blacks and southern and eastern
Europeans scored the lowest. TUCKER, supra note 1, at 79-81.
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Act of 1924, which severely restricted the influx of immigrants from southern and
eastern European countries. The Act's explicit purpose was to restrict the ability of
such immigrants to legally enter the United States by placing numerical per-countrylimits on southern and eastern European countries.
Those European immigrants able to enter the United States were caught in an "in
between" racial status amid those groups traditionally conceived of as non-white
(e.g., blacks and Asians) and the northern European descendants generally thought
of as "white."'" 8 These new immigrants were eventually able to assimilate into
whiteness by adopting American cultural norms, by strongly embracing a white
American racial identity, by contrasting their racial status with the status of nonwhite groups such as blacks and Asians, and by accumulating political power.119
The Immigration Act of 1924 also explicitly tied entry into the United States to
the right of naturalization. The 1790 Naturalization Act restricted U.S. citizenship to
"white persons" for almost one hundred years. After the end of slavery, the
Reconstruction Amendments extended citizenship rights to "aliens of African
nativity . . . or descent." From that time until the Immigration Act of 1952, the
naturalization right was only accorded to "whites" and African-Americans. The
naturalization limitation spawned a series of cases where the courts had to legally
interpret race and the meaning of "whiteness."
In one of the first federal cases to analyze "whiteness" under the Naturalization
Act, the Federal Circuit Court of California had to determine whether a Chinese
person of the "Mongolian" race was a "white" person.1 20 The In re Ah Yup court
admitted that the words "white person.., constitute a very indefinite description of
a class of persons, where none can be said to be literally white, and those called
white may be found of every shade from the lightest blonde to the most swarthy
brunette. ' 21
Nonetheless, the court relied on anthropological findings by
Blumenbach and other race theorists that separated the world into five distinct racial
groups: Caucasian, Black, Indian, Mongoloid, and Malay. 22 The court also
examined society's general understanding of the racial term "white" and determined
1 23
that Chinese persons were not commonly understood by society to be white.
Other federal courts similarly relied on the anthropological theory of race
espoused by Blumenbach and others to analyze whiteness. The Circuit Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, for instance, held in In re Najour that a Syrian
applicant for naturalization was "white" based on scientific anthropological findings
that Syrians were part of the "Caucasian" race.1 24 The In re Najour court was also
concerned with racial appearance and assimilatory potential of the applicant, noting
that the petitioner was "not particularly
dark" and had the "appearance and
' 25
characteristics of the Caucasian race."'
Fifty years after In re Ah Yup was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the
118James R. Barrett & David Roediger, In-between Peoples: Race, Nationality and the "New
Immigrant" Working Class, 16 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 3 passim (1997).
"9 Id.; see also NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 1-2 (1996).
120 In

re Ah Yup, I F. Cas. 223, 223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878) (No. 104).

121Id.
122 Id.
123Id.
24

'

at 223-24.
In re Najour, 174 F. 735, 735-36 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909).

125Id. at 735.
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126
case to find that a Japanese person applying for U.S. citizenship was not white.
Notably, in Ozawa v. United States the Court implicitly acknowledged the fluid
nature of race by rejecting a skin color test:
Manifestly the test afforded by the mere color of the skin of each
individual is impracticable, as that differs greatly among persons of
the same race, even among Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible
gradations from the fair blond to the swarthy brunette, the latter
being darker than many of the lighter hued persons of the brown or
yellow races. Hence to adopt the color test alone would result in a
confused overlapping of races and a gradual merging
of one into the
27
other, without any practical line of separation.
Instead, the Court relied on the "common understanding" test employed by In re Ah
Yup to hold that "the words 'white person' were meant to indicate only a person of
what is popularly known as the Caucasian race."'128 In doing so, the Court expressed
a willingness to defer to "scientific" interpretations of race and whiteness; a
willingness that continues to this day.
The Court, however, departed from a strictly scientific understanding of race
when it decided United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind. 12 9 In Thind, the Court was
faced with determining whether a Hindu from India was a white person within the
meaning of the Naturalization Act.1 30 Although the plaintiff petitioning for
naturalization presented scientific anthropological evidence that Indian Hindus
should be classified as Caucasian,' 31 the Court rejected the evidence, and instead
applied precedent and the "common understanding" test. 132 The Court held that
Hindus from India are not white, explaining that it "is a matter of familiar
observation and knowledge that the physical group characteristics of the Hindus
render them readily distinguishable from . . . [those] commonly recognized as
white."' 33
In reaching its holding, the Court not only relied on common
understandings of whiteness, but also on the potential of Indian Hindus to assimilate
among Americans based on their appearance.
The assimilatory potential of naturalization petitioners remained at the center of
legal analysis following the Thind case. In United States v. Cartozian, the federal
district court
of Oregon had to decide whether a person from Armenia was
"white." 135 The district court determined that Armenians were indeed white, but did

126Ozawa

117Id. at

v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 196-98 (1922).

197.

128Id.

129261 U.S. 204, 208-10 (1923).

130 Id. at 204.
3'Id.at 210.
132Id. at 209-10, 213.
133
Id. at 215.
134Thind, 261 U.S. at 215. "[I]t cannot be doubted that the children born in this country of Hindu parents
would retain indefinitely the clear evidence of their ancestry. . . .What we suggest is merely racial
difference, and it is of such character and extent that the great body of our people instinctively recognize
it and reject the thought of assimilation." Id.; see also In re Ahmed Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843, 845-46
(E.D. Mich. 1942) (holding that person from Yemen was not white under the common understanding
test, and that the Ozawa and Thind Courts had established that skin color and anthropological findings
were not dispositive regarding racial classification).
"' 6 F.2d 919, 919 (D. Or. 1925).
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not rely solely on anthropological findings provided by Franz Boas and others that
Armenians could scientifically be considered "Caucasians."1 36 Rather, the court
focused on the assimilatory potential of Armenians.' 37 The court supported its
finding of whiteness by noting that Armenians are Christians, they typically occupy
a higher social and economic class, and they have138been able to intermarry with white
Americans and assimilate into American society.
The Naturalization cases demonstrate the courts' willingness to rely on scientific
theories of race to the extent that these theories reflected the "common
understanding" of society's perceptions of whiteness and assimilatory potential. The
flawed assumptions of race theory at the time led to results that did not comport with
conventional understandings of the meaning of whiteness. Accordingly, the courts
resorted to other measures of whiteness, such as the potential of specific immigrant
groups to assimilate into American society. 139 In this way, immigrants from
southern and eastern European countries eventually acquired whiteness, while those
from Asian countries and Mexico were generally denied whiteness.
H. Nazi Germany and World War II
Prior to World War II, the European eugenics movement became increasingly
popular. Eugenics purported to offer a scientific methodology for applying
biological theories of race to improve society. On the eve of World War II, both
American and European eugenicists were calling for eugenic reforms. The Swedish
Professor Herman Lundborg argued in 1931 that "the inherently degenerate, should
140
by confinement, sterilization, and other means be prevented from reproducing."
The prevalent fear at the time was that "[i]f strong measures in race hygiene are not
taken in time, the [superior white] race will meet with dissolution and extinction....
141
We must at any price keep the quality of the [white] race at a high level.'

German scientists and political leaders were quite interested in the findings of
Social Darwinists and eugenicists, and eventually concluded that the nation's postWorld War I economic decline was due to racial biological degeneration.
Attributing the country's economic woes to state expenditures for the benefit of the
biologically inferior ironically resonated with the working class.
The newly established post-World War I Weimar government earnestly began to
investigate the possibility of applying eugenic principles to society. Germany's
government established "race hygiene" - Rassenhygiene - centers to develop
medical policy that accounted for the health of the "race." German scientists soon
136Id. at

920-22.

137
Id.
138
Id. at 920-21; accord United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1910) (holding that a Persian
Parsee was white, based in part on findings that the Parsees were intelligent and wealthy).
139At other times, the courts interpreted race in political terms. The United States entered into the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hildago with Mexico in 1848 to end the Mexican-American War. The Treaty provided
that Mexicans occupying land could acquire U.S. citizenship, however, the Naturalization statute at the
time limited citizenship to whites and African-Americans. Accordingly, the courts often determined
Mexicans to be white for purposes of naturalization. See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337, 354-55 (W.D.
Tex. 1897) (holding that Congress intended Mexicans to be white for naturalization purposes pursuant to
the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo).
140Herman Lundborg, Race Biological Perspectives, 9 Soc. Forces 397, 400 (1931) (emphasis in
original).
141
Id. (emphasis in original)
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proposed sterilization programs for the biologically inferior that were modeled after
the sterilization statutes in the United States.
The German eugenicists also came
to see merit in adopting anti-miscegenation laws similar to those existing in the
United States. 143 However, the anti-miscegenation laws proposed by Weimar
eugenicists not only aimed to prevent "whites" from reproducing with "blacks" or
"non-whites," but also sought to promote Nordic and Aryan purity by preventing
intermarriage with non-Nordic Europeans. 144 Many German eugenicists particularly
wanted to prevent the mixing of Nordic and Jewish "blood."
Eugenic scientific findings therefore supplied scientific credibility to the
"Nordic" movement in Germany. Led by Hans F.K. Gunther, who would later be
regarded as the founder of Nazi racial ideology, the Nordic movement sought to
eliminate threats to the racial purity of German citizens by preventing intermixture
with non-Nordic blood. 45 According to Gunther, the eugenic institutes, sterilization
programs, and restrictive immigration policies established by the United States were
"only the first step ... to still more definite laws dealing with race and eugenics. '' 46
Nonetheless, the Weimar government was slow to implement the sterilization
programs proposed by German scientists. 147 As a result, eugenicists turned their
support to the growing Nazi political organization,148led by Adolf Hitler, which had
seemed to co-opt the Nordic movement as its own.
After Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party seized control of Germany in 1933, the
basic scientific principles developed by geneticists and eugenicists formally became
applied science. 149 The German "Biological" state had come to fruition. The Nazi
government initially passed compulsory sterilization laws for people suffering from
various so-called hereditary diseases: feeblemindedness, blindness, deafness,
alcoholism, and deformities.
After the sterilization laws were passed, Germany
established medical colleges to train all physicians as "genetic doctors," whose
primary concern was the genetic racial health of the nation, rather than the individual
patient.' 5 1 The Nuremberg Laws were passed a couple of years later, which barred
marriage between Aryans
and Jews, and also restricted Jews from occupying
52
government positions.1
Because Nazi leaders felt that the sterilization and anti-miscegenation laws were
not eliminating racial genetic impurities in a timely manner, the leaders implemented
euthanasia programs, initially directed towards the physically and mentally
handicapped. 53 These euthanasia programs, however, were quickly broadened to
target all genetically inferior non-Aryan persons, including Jews, Romas and Slavs.

142TUCKER,

supra note 1, at 112.

143Id. at 113.
'44Id.
at 113-14.
45
1

Id.at 115.

146Id. at

116 (quoting H.F.K. GUNTHER, THE RACIAL ELEMENTS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 245 (Kennikat

1970) (1927)).
147TUCKER, supra note 1, at 117.
48 Id.

141Id. at 118-19.
5

OId.at 119-20.
' Id.at 120.
152
TUCKER, supra note 1, at 122.
53
Id.at 127.
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The "Final Solution" was specifically aimed at annihilating the Jewish population,
who were deemed to be a "parasitic54race" that posed a direct biological threat to
Germany's Aryan racial community.'
The Holocaust unquestionably serves as one of the gravest reminders of the
inherent dangers in ascribing to a value-laden biological theory of race. In many
ways, Nazi Germany was simply applying the demented lessons of early racial
genetic theory in an effort to facilitate the human evolutionary process. As a result,
approximately two-thirds of the Jewish population of Europe - six million persons was murdered. 155 Millions of other Europeans died in forced labor camps or from
the euthanasia programs.'1 56 The racial genocide did not end until the Allied Forces
defeated Nazi Germany on March 7, 1945.157
I. Post-World War II Developments in Race Theory
The unconscionable attempted genocide of an entire group of people shocked the
world into rejecting biological theories of race. The newly formed post-war United
Nations created the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO")
in 1948, and tasked it with developing an authoritative scientific statement on race to
combat race prejudice.1 58 UNESCO drew upon leading anthropologists, medical
doctors and biologists to scientifically debunk the biological conception of race. On
July 18, 1950, the UNESCO commission made the following observations regarding
race:
1. Scientists have reached general agreement in recognizing that
mankind is one: that all men belong to the same species, Homo
sapiens. It is further generally agreed among scientists that all men
are probably derived from the same common stock; and that such
differences as exist between different groups of mankind are due to
the operation of evolutionary factors of differentiation such as
isolation, the drift and random fixation of the material particles
which control heredity (the genes), changes in the structure of these
particles, hybridization and natural selection.

14. In these ways groups have arisen of varying stability and degree
of differentiation which have been classified in different ways for
different purposes. The biological fact of race and the myth of
'race' should be distinguished. For all practical social purposes
'race' is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth. 159

54

1 1d. at

127-28.

155United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, The Holocaust, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?
lang=en&Moduleld= 10005143 (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
156Id.
157 Id. (noting how the "death marches" employed by Nazi Germany continued up until
the day of
surrender).
158Harry L. Shapiro, Revised Version of UNESCO Statement on Race, 10 AM. J. OF PHYSICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 363, 363 (1952).
159 UNESCO, supra note 2, at 5-14.
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The UNESCO statement rejected the pseudo-scientific claims of the
physiogomists, Social Darwinists, and eugenicists that racial differences existed in
regards to genetic inferiority or superiority. As a whole, the statement adopted the
prevailing trend in race theory that racial difference was the result of environment
and culture, rather than nature and biology: "given similar degrees of cultural
opportunity to realize their potentialities,
the average achievement of the members of
'1 60
each ethnic group is about the same."
Progressive anthropologists decried that "race isn't very important
biologically,"'1 61 that "the difference between negroes and whites is to be credited to
social heritage rather than to race,"' 62 and that it might "be better if the term 'race'
were altogether abandoned." 163 Franz Boas, in particular, discredited scientific
explanations of racial difference and noted that there was no evidence of racial
difference in brain structure that "will endure serious criticism." 164 Rather, Boas and
other modem anthropologists believed that only cultural and geographical variations
could account for racial difference.
Nonetheless, the UNESCO statement was flawed in many respects. Some of the
inadequacies of the UNESCO statement can be traced to the fact that the statement
was first and foremost a political document reacting against the racial policies of
Nazi Germany. For instance, the UNESCO statement retained the flawed tnpartite
division of humans into three "races": Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid. 1 5 But
as the anthropologist S.L. Washburn observed over forty years ago, "[t]here are no
three primary races, no three major groups. The idea of three primary races stems
from nineteenth-century typology;
it is totally misleading to put the black-skinned
16
people of the world together."
The UNESCO statement also used conditional language that implied that while
science had not yet established the biological inferiority or superiority of specific
races, perhaps one day it would. In particular, the statement acknowledged that it
may be "possible . . . that some types of innate capacity for intellectual and
emotional responses are commoner in one human group than in another," but that the
"best available scientific evidence" had not yet established such biological

differences. 167
Finally, the UNESCO statement was flawed in that it urged society to interpret
human difference through the lens of ethnicity rather than race: "it would be better
when speaking of human races to drop the term 'race' altogether and speak of ethnic
groups.' 168 The difficulty with an ethnicity approach to race lies in its liberal
assumption that racial prejudice and inequality can be achieved solely through
integration, assimilation and equal opportunity civil rights laws. The goal of
meaningful integration has become increasingly difficult to achieve. The Supreme
Court's recent decision in ParentsInvolved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
160

Id. at 7.

161S.L.

Washburn, The Study of Race, 65 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 521, 524 (1963).
D. Wallis, Race and Culture, 23 THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY 313, 315-16 (1926).

162Wilson

163Ashley Montagu, The Concept ofRace, 64 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 919, 919 (1962).
164Franz Boas, THE MIND OF PRIMITIVE MAN 105-06 (1911).
165UNESCO,

supra note 2, at 6.

166Washburn, supra note 161, at 523.
167UNESCO,

supra note 2, at 9.

168Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
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Dist. No. 1 demonstrates this difficulty. 16 9 Relying solely on equal opportunity
programs to remedy racial inequality fails to address the historical effects of
systemic racial discrimination.
Further, most non-white racial groups find
assimilation to white cultural norms undesirable and unavoidable.1 7 1 As such,
ethnicity approaches to race "have devolved into neoconservatism, which can do no
better than reprove racially defined minorities for their continuing 172 raceconsciousness and supposed failure to take advantage of civil rights reforms.'
PART II. MODERN CONCEPTS OF RACE: DEFINING THE "OTHER"

Modem race theories largely adopt the findings of the UNESCO commission and
explain race in terms of socio-political and historical process. Race is thus
commonly defined along the lines of "a concept that signifies and symbolizes
sociopolitical conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human
bodies." 173 Race is viewed as a social and political construction, its meaning and
content derived not from biological fact but from political and class struggle. Race
is regarded as an "ideology of inequality devised to rationalize European attitudes
and treatment of the conquered and enslaved peoples" and as a "strategy for
dividing, ranking, and controlling colonized people" to maintain existing power
dynamics. 174 As Professor Angela Harris succinctly states, the prevailing view is
that "race does not
exist in the body but rather is the product of a socially-produced
75
understanding.",1
Modem race theory is therefore characterized by an explicit rejection of
biological accounts of "racial" difference.
The sociologist Howard Winant
summarizes the vast scientific and social literature by observing that:
Although the concept of race appeals to biologically based human
characteristics (phenotypes), selection of these particular human
features for purposes of racial signification is always and
necessarily a social and historical process. There is no biological
169127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007) (holding that allegedly compelling interest of diversity in higher
education could not justify districts' use of racial classification in student school assignments and
districts failed to show that use of racial classifications in their student school assignments were
necessary to achieve their objective of racial diversity).
170See Christian B. Sundquist, Equal Opportunity, Individual Liberty, and Meritocracy in Education:
Reinforcing Structures of Privilege and Inequality, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY LAW & POL'Y 227, 235-36
(2002) (arguing that equal opportunity education reforms reinforce structures of privilege).
171See Winant, supra note 6, at 179; infra Part II.
172Winant, supra note 6, at 179.
173Id. at 172. See generally Anthony Paul Farley, All Flesh Shall See it Together, 19 CHICANO-LATINO
L. REV. 163, 166 (1998) ("There is no such thing as 'race' save as a 'social construction."').
174American Anthropologist Association, AAA Statement on Race, 100 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 712, 712
(1999); see also IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:

THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1997)

(analyzing the legal construction of white identity by examining a series of early twentieth-century cases
where state and federal courts sought to determine and define who was "white" enough to naturalize an
American citizen).
175Angela Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colorism in the New Century, 10
BERKELEY J. OF AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 52, 68 (2008); see also JOE R. FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOHER
FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS (5th ed. 1996) ("Human populations singled out as 'races' are
simply groups with visible differences that Europeans and European-Americans have decided to
emphasize as important in their social, economic, and political relations. Such racial categorizing is
neither objective nor scientific.").
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basis for distinguishing human groups along the lines of race, and
the sociohistorical categories employed to differentiate among these
examination, to be
groups reveal themselves, upon serious
76
imprecise if not completely arbitrary.'
Courts in the United States have largely adopted the mantra of modem race
theory and, as a result, have struggled to legally ascertain a person's race. In Saint
Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Supreme Court considered a 42 U.S.C. § 1981
employment discrimination claim filed by a U.S. citizen bom in Iraq. 177 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on the grounds that the
plaintiff was admittedly of the "Caucasian race" and was thus unable to establish a
prima facie claim under § 1981 because of this racial status. 178 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiff had properly alleged
racial discrimination under § 1981, even though Arabs were currently classified as
Caucasian.1 79 The Court began its analysis by noting in a footnote that modem
biology and anthropology "criticize[d] racial classifications as arbitrary" and that
race is "for the most part sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature."18 From
this premise, the Court examined the legislative history and held that § 1981 was
intended to protect "identifiable" classes or persons from intentional discrimination
based on their "ancestry or ethnic characteristics." ' 1 The Court found that such
discrimination is "racial discrimination ... whether or not it would be classified as
racial in terms of modem scientific theory."' 82 Fortunately, the Court stated that a
showing of "distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981
protection," and that proof of ancestry is sufficient.' 83 Accordingly, the Court
affirmed the determination of the court of appeals that the plaintiff had established a
valid claim of racial discrimination.184
Similarly, in Perkins v. Lake County Deptartment of Utilities, a district court in
Ohio adopted a sociological view of race in addressing a Title V1118 5 racial
176Winant, supra note 6, at 172; see also David Brion Davis, Constructing Race: A Reflection, 54 WM.

& MARY Q. 7 (1997) (noting that "responsible scientists have long discredited any biological or genetic
definition of racial groups" and that "historians have increasingly recognized that the so-called races of
mankind are the fortuitous and arbitrary inventions of European and American history, the by-products,
primarily, of Europe's religious, economic and imperial expansion across the seas of the earth"); Sipress,
supra note 56, at 175-85 ("The tripartite division of humankind into 'Negroid,' 'mongoloid,' and
'Caucasoid' occupies a position in the biological sciences equivalent to that of the Ptolemaic model of
the universe in astronomy.").
' 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
178Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis Coll., No. 80-1550, 1985 WL 9627, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 1985).
"' Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 607.
8
oId.at 610 n.4.
Id.at 613.
"'
182
id.

83

1 id.

184
See generally Pourghoraishi v.Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that Supreme

Court precedent requires that courts "view race broadly" in holding that a person of Iranian descent had
established a valid Title VII claim); id. (finding that "strict adherence to taxonomical, biological, or
anthropological definitions" is "inconsequential" in determining race); Revisions to the Standards for the
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782, 58,782 (Oct. 30, 1997)
("[Federal recial classifications] represent a social-political construct designed for collecting data on the
race and ethnicity of broad population groups in this country, and are not anthropologically or
scientifically based.").
1'42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
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discrimination action.' 86 The plaintiff alleged that he had been subjected to racial
discrimination on account of his Native American descent, but the defendants moved
for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff was not Native American
and thus was not a member of the class protected by Title VII. The district court
observed that the term "race" was of such "doubtful sociological validity as to be
scientifically meaningless.' 87 The district court then struggled to determine the
plaintiffs race, based on conflicting evidence presented at trial.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants presented the
expert testimony of a genealogist to demonstrate that the plaintiff was white. The
genealogist examined documentary evidence such as birth certificates, death
certificates and census materials to conclude that the plaintiff had "no significant
percentage of Indian blood."' 188 In response, the plaintiff presented evidence that he
always believed he was a Native-American and holds himself out as such; that
stories of his family history demonstrate that he is a Native-American; that plaintiff
was listed as a Native-American in the defendant's employment records; and
testimony from a Native-American that the plaintiff "appeared to look like an Indian
to me."'189 Based on this evidence, the district court determined that race analysis is
conducted by examining subjective perceptions of race, physical appearance, the
relationship between the person and the racial community they are claiming
membership in, and self-identification and representation. In particular, the court
found that documentary evidence such as birth and death certificates and census

records were "not dispositive" due to their notorious inaccuracy.' 90 Accordingly, the
court held that there was insufficient evidence that the plaintiff was not NativeAmerican and dismissed the motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit focused on non-ancestral markers of
race in Bennum v. Rutgers State University,191 a Title VII racial discrimination case
in which the court affirmed the lower court's determination that the plaintiff was
Hispanic. The defendant argued that plaintiff had not established a prima facie racial
discrimination case because his mother was born in Romania, his father was born in
Israel, and plaintiff had conceded that his parents were not Hispanic. 192 The court
nonetheless held that the plaintiff had established that he was Hispanic based on "his
birth in Argentina, his belief that he is Hispanic, identifies with
and continues to
' 93
adopt Spanish culture in his life and speaks Spanish in his home."'
As the cases reviewed above illustrate, federal courts in the United States have
generally embraced the modem rejection of biological theories of race. Instead,
modem courts have focused on racial "markers" such as ancestry, physical
appearance, language, outsider perception, and self-identification to determine race.

186860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
187

id.

88

1 Id.

189Id.

190 Id.; see also Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-

Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1259 (1994) (documenting the "arbitrary" consideration of race
in birth certificates).
' 941 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1991).
92
' 93 Id. at 171.
1 Id. at 173.
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PART 1II.

MODERN "RACE SCIENCE": DNA INTERPRETATIONS OF RACE

The historical view of race as a social and political construct devoid of biological
meaning is being displaced by the growing belief that DNA technology and genetic
science are able to isolate one's true biological racial essence. Genetic ancestry
companies promise to determine individual race based on saliva samples;
pharmaceutical companies market "ethnic drugs" tailored for specific races;19 law
enforcement increasingly relies on DNA databases to create racial profiles of
suspects; and courts in the United States are willing to admit probabilistic estimates
of race based on DNA analysis. Notwithstanding the post-war rejection of biological
race, contemporary society has unquestioningly assumed that race has some
genetically-determinable essence.
A. The Science of DNA
Deoxyribonucleic acid, otherwise known as "DNA," is a complex molecule that
is found in every cell of a person's body.1 95 DNA provides a genetic map of the
human body by storing biological information in four subunits of nucleic acid:
adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine (T).19 6 The DNA molecule
contains a long sequence of these subunits, in a shape resembling that of a double
helix or "ladder."'1 97 This DNA bundle, which is tightly compressed into
chromosomes located in the nucleus of each human cell, contains "about three
billion chemical nucleotides encoding roughly 30,000 genes, discrete chunks of
DNA that are translated into individual proteins."' 98 The chromosomes containing
genetic DNA material come in pairs, 199 with one chromosome inherited from the
father, and the other inherited from the mother.
While scientific investigation has conclusively determined that humans share
ninety-nine percent of their genetic DNA material, every person has a unique DNA
distribution of such genes. A person's DNA molecular signature can be detected in
almost every sample of human tissue. This fact has obvious forensic implications,
and law enforcement has long relied on DNA analysis to identify criminal
perpetrators.
B. Forensic Genetic Determinations of Race
The advent of DNA technology has nonetheless ushered in a new era of "racial"
discovery and investigation. Private genetic companies increasingly claim the ability
to scientifically determine race based on DNA samples. One such company,
DNAPrint Genomics, boldly states that it has "applied the most recent advancements

194See, e.g., Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of RacialProfilingin Medicine,
39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 391, 391-92 (2004).
195National Library of Medicine, DNA, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/visibleproofs/education/dna/

dna.pdf
(last visited Apr. 21, 2008).
196 id.
197Id.
198Id.
199Id.
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in human genomic technology for the deciphering of an individual's race." 200
DNAPrint offers a forensic product called "DNAWitness," which is "a genetic test
for the deduction of the heritable component of race" 20 1 that purports to provide "the
percentage of genetic make up amongst the four possible groups of Sub-Saharan
African, Native American, East Asian, and European." 20 2 According to DNAPrint,
law enforcement and district attorney's offices "from various
cities," such as New
20 3
York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, have used DNAWitness.

The police in Baton Rouge, Louisiana recently sought out the services of
DNAPrint to aid in the investigation of a serial killer. The criminal investigators
initially targeted white
S204 suspects in the killings before sending a crime scene genetic
sample to DNAPrint.
The sample was analyzed as belonging to a person who was
eighty-five percent African ancestry and fifteen percent Native American, and thus
the police in Baton Rouge shifted their focus to "black" suspects. When a black
man, Derrick T. Lee, was eventually arrested and convicted for the murders, the
genetic test was hailed as being able to accurately determine race based on forensic
samples. 205 Unsurprisingly, the case was eventually solved by using other evidence.
Similar news has surfaced in Canada, where law enforcement departments are
reportedly submitting forensic samples to genetic labs to "tell police if the offender.
is white, black, Asian, native, or of mixed race. 20 6 Likewise, the forensic science
laboratory used by the police in Birmingham, England has claimed the ability to
differentiate
between "Afro-Caribbeans" and Caucasians by analyzing DNA
20 7
samples.
A genetics study recently appearing in the American Journal of Human Genetics
has also claimed the ability to scientifically determine race. Challenging "the widely
held belief that race is only a social construct,"0 the study argued that "genetic
cluster analysis showed
near-perfect correspondence with the self-reported
2 9
race/ethnic categories.
C. Population Genetics and Race
State and federal prosecutors and law enforcement departments have willingly
embraced genetic science that purports to determine race. DNA analysis of crime200Ted Kessis, Racial Identification and Future Application of SNPs, Presentation at Forensic
Bioinformatics 3rd Annual Conference: DNA from Crime Scene to Courtroom (Aug. 21, 2004),
availableat http://bioforensics.com/conference04/RacialIdentification/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2008).
201 Id.
202DNAPrint Genomics, http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/productsandservices/forensics/ (last visited
Apr. 21, 2008).
Id.
204Nicholas Wade, Unusual Use ofDNA Aided in SerialKiller Search, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at A4.
205Id.; DNAPrint, supra note 202 (touting the "role DNAWitness had in the resolution of this case").
206Carolyn Abraham, Molecular Eyewitnesses: DNA Gets a Human Face; Controversial crime-scene
test smacks of racialprofiling, critics say, TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL (CAN.), June 25, 2005, at A6.
207Ian W. Evett, J.S. Buckleton, A. Raymond, & H. Roberts, The Evidentiary Value of DNA Profiles,
33
J. OF THE FORENSIC SCI. SOC. 243 (1993).
208Troy Duster, Explaining Differential Trust of DNA Forensic Technology: GroundedAssessment or
Inexplicable Paranoia?,34 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 293, 298 (2006) (quoting J. Zhang, New Study Links
Race and DNA Material,STANFORD DAILY, Feb. 4, 2005).
209H. Tang et al., Genetic Structure, Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity, and Confounding in Case-Control
Association Studies, 76 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 268, 268-75 (2005).
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scene genetic material has been a staple of law enforcement forensics for well over a
decade. The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000210 compels individuals
convicted of certain federal crimes to submit a genetic DNA sample to law
enforcement authorities. 211 The Act also provided for $170 million in federal funds
to support state efforts to collect DNA samples from state criminal
offenders. 212 As
213
a result, every state now maintains a DNA collection program.
At the federal level, DNA samples from qualified federal offenders are submitted
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") for analysis.
The FBI then creates
a DNA profile of the sample by using short tandem repeat technology ("STR"). The
STR process analyzes the presence of alleles 215 located at thirteen markers (also
called "loci") in the DNA sample. The thirteen STR loci are located at nongenic
portions of DNA that are not recognized as producing traits. Indeed, these particular
STR loci located on "junk DNA" were "purposely selected because they are not
associated with any known physical or medical characteristics. '2 16 Despite their
nongenic nature, there is sufficient variance in the representation of alleles at the
STR loci that the possibility that two randomly selected individuals will share the
representation
is infinitesimally
small. 217
theDNA
FBI generates
asame
STRallele
(DNA)
profile of each
sample, and records
the Accordingly,
result in a large
database

210

10 U.S.C. § 1565 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 14135, 14135a-14135e (2006).
The qualifying federal offenses that mandate submission of a DNA sample

211 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d).

include murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, child abuse, sexual abuse, kidnapping,
burglary, robbery, arson, and conspiracy to commit such crimes. Id.
212Id.
213

See DNAResource.com, http://www.dnaresource.com/domestic.html

(last visited Apr. 23, 2008)

(summarizing state DNA legislation); Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS-NDIS Statistics,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2008).
214See 42 U.S.C. § 14135b(b) ("The Director of the Bureau of Prisons or Agency (as
applicable) shall
furnish each DNA sample collected under subsection (a) of this section to the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, who shall carry out a DNA analysis on each such DNA sample and include the
results
in CODIS.").
215
NAT'L COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING 35 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl
/nij/183697.pdf. Alleles refer to "genic variants" that are responsible for producing certain traits. Id.
The following provides a useful example:
[A] specific allele of a particular gene is responsible for the enzyme that converts
the amino acid phenylalanine into tyrosine. When this enzyme is missing or
abnormal, the child develops the disease, phenylketonuria, or PKU. The result is
severe mental retardation unless the child is treated; happily, with a specific diet the
child develops normally. A child will develop PKU only if both representatives of
the appropriate chromosome pair carry the abnormal allele. If there is only one
PKU allele and the other is normal, the child will be normal; the amount of enzyme
produced by a single normal allele is enough ....
[Because] about 97 percent [of DNA is nongenic, and because] these nongenic
regions show the same genetic variability that genes do, in fact usually more, ...
the words commonly used for describing genes (e.g., allele, homozygous,
polymorphic) are carried over to [nongenic] DNA regions.
Id. at 11-12.
216 H.R. REP. No. 106-900(l), at 27 (2000).
217 See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing the FBI's analysis
of DNA samples).
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called the Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS")."' The CODIS system records
DNA profiles submitted by both federal and state DNA collection programs. As of
July 2008, CODIS had logged the DNA profiles of over six million criminal
offenders and 225,400 crime scene samples.
Law enforcement can use the DNA profiles contained in the CODIS database in a
number of different ways. The police can use CODIS to compare DNA samples
obtained from different crime scenes in order to connect unsolved or multiple
crimes. The police can also use CODIS to connect crime scene DNA samples to a
specific DNA profile of an offender. Finally, the police and federal and state
prosecutors can use CODIS to compare crime scene DNA samples to the DNA
sample obtained - willingly or not - from a criminal suspect.

The comparison of DNA samples is often made by genetic scientists employed by
the FBI or state forensics departments, but state prosecutors increasingly rely on
private genetics experts to provide such analysis. In any event, the genetic scientist
will declare a "match" if all of the DNA segments on the STR loci are identical. The
discovery of a match does not mean that the criminal suspect is without question the
only possible contributor to the crime scene sample, but merely that the suspect is a
potential contributor of the crime scene sample. Therefore, the second step of the
DNA identification process involves producing a probability estimate of the chance
that someone other than the criminal suspect could have contributed the crime scene
sample.
The probability analysis can produce two different statistical estimates. First, the
expert can simply compare the tested samples with information collected about the
general population, and thereby determine the frequency with which the particular
DNA profile appears in the general population. This method of statistical
interpretation does not appear to create any tension with modern race theory, as the
profile is merely compared to the frequency distribution existing in the general
population, without regard to race.
However, the second method of probability analysis is problematic. This method
of statistical interpretation relies heavily on the scientific findings of "population
genetics." "Population genetics" refers to the study of genetic differentiation and
diversity present in a specific human population, or subset of a particular species.
While neutrally defined and titled, the term "population genetics" is often a mere
proxy for the study of genetic racial differentiation. Understandably concerned with
the potential for controversy stemming from the biological study of race, geneticists
have developed a coded lexicon to safely discuss race by using such terms as
"population group," "geographic region," and ancestry. Accordingly, in using this
second method of probability analysis the geneticist compares the DNA profile to a
specific human population group - e.g., Black, Hispanic, Asian and Caucasian.
Relying on principles of population genetics, criminal prosecutors present expert
determinations of the frequency with which a criminal suspect's DNA profile
appears in that suspect's "racial" group. While post-war courts in the United States
traditionally embraced the notion that race is a socio-political construction with no
biological meaning, modem courts are increasingly receptive of such expert
218 id.

219 See Federal Bureau, supra note 213.
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testimony regarding the genetic probability that a person is a member of a particular
race. It is now common for courts to admit into evidence probabilistic expert
estimates that only I in 2600 "American Indians," 220 1 in 41 million "Blacks," 22 1 or
,,222
1 in 35,000 "Caucasians,
would produce a DNA sample matching that of the
22 3
criminal defendant.
D. Reconciling Modem Race Theory with DNA Race Science
Similar to the development of pseudo-scientific principles in the nineteenth
century to justify racial discrimination, the modem use of genetics and DNA analysis
to determine race miscomprehends the nature of race and human difference and fails
to interrogate culturally learned assumptions about race. It is without question that
"race" is entirely a social and political construction, with absolutely no biological
meaning that can be discerned from genetic analysis. As demonstrated by the
preceding discussion of the historical evolution of the race concept, a person's racial
categorization has nothing to do with that person's biological or genetic make-up.
Rather, "race" is an unstable and continually contested "brand" of categorization that
attempts to accord physical, moral, and intellectual attributes to such perceived
human differences as ancestry, skin color, language, nationality, hair texture, and
phenotype. The entire notion that there are three to four distinct categories of human
races was developed in order to permit unequal treatment of specific human
populations, justified by long-since-rejected pseudo-scientific principles grounded in
anthropology, biology and genetics. The history of the race concept itself belies any
argument that race has some biological essence that can be discerned through DNA
analysis.
A socio-biological understanding of race fails as an intermediate approach. Such
a construction would acknowledge the historical dimension of race as socially
constructed to preserve patterns of political inequality, yet would maintain that race
could nonetheless be ascertained based on the .001% of "junk DNA" that accounts
for human differentiation, such as skin color and hair. Such an understanding of
"race" fails as a person's constructed or perceived race may be completely
disconnected from that person's appearance, skin color, or ancestry. A distinction
must be made between "race" (a social construction devoid of genetic meaning) and
physical differences in phenotype (which are not per se encoded with racial
meaning). It is certainly true that differences in morphological traits, such as skin
color and hair texture, do exist among humans. However, "[a] widespread
misconception is that the analysis of morphological traits, such as skeletal measures
or skin colour [sic], demonstrates a clear racial subdivision of humankind., 224 The
small morphological differences that result from the .001% of variant genetic code
210 United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1193 (8th Cir. 1993).
22 Govt. of the Virgin Is. v. Penn, 838 F. Supp. 1054, 1065 (D. Virgin Is. 1993).
222 United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 563 (6th Cir. 1994).
223 See Christian B. Sundquist, Forensic Genetics and the Ascendancy of Modern "Race
Science":
Establishingthe Inadmissibility of DNA Estimates of Race, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. (forthcoming
2009) (critiquing the admission of racial probabilistic estimates at trial).
224 Lorena Madrigal & Guido Barbujani, Partitioningof Genetic Variation in Human Populations and
the Concept of Race, in ANTHROPOLOGICAL GENETICS: THEORY, METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 19, 20
(Michael Crawford ed., 2007).
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can have no racial meaning, as race is an arbitrary social construction devoid of
substantive meaning.
Genetic studies that utilize racial population structures assume that there has been
some consensus on the number of human "races," and the meaning and content of
each racial category. However, no such consensus exists. As our troubled history of
race science demonstrates, scientists at various times have estimated the number of
225
Even
human races to be as few as three and as many as two hundred.
contemporary studies of human genetic population diversity rely on different
It is apparent that analysis of
assumptions regarding the number of races.
races
is simply impossible if the
human
among
differentiation
genetic
purported
realities, they must
are
biological
races
"If
definition of race remains unsettled.
227 be
countries."
across
differ
catalogues
race
forensic
whereas
everywhere,
the same
The vast majority of geneticists have affirmed that race has no biological
meaning. The DNA molecule simply does not give biological meaning to extant
historical categories of race. Geneticists have discovered that the greatest genetic
variation occurs within so-called "racial" population groups. 228 As such, genetics
has demonstrated that "allele frequency comparisons among human populations
rarely show discontinuities that map onto racial boundaries." 229 Numerous genetics
studies have determined that there is no scientific basis for a division of humans into
ascertained that
genetically defined groups. 230 Other genetic studies have similarly
231
classifications by race were poor descriptors of genetic variation.
The Yale geneticist Kenneth Kidd explains that there is "a virtual continuum of
genetic variation" throughout the world, and that "there's no such thing as race in
Homo sapiens."232 It is particularly interesting that Africans possess the greatest
degree of genetic variation, both when compared to other Africans, and when
compared to non-Africans.23 3 Therefore, from a genetic standpoint the "Black"
racial category is particularly disjointed given that two unrelated Black Africans or
to one another than are
African-Americans are less
234 likely to be genetically similar
two people of other races.
The assumption that racial groups conveniently form genetically distinct
The
population structures for scientific analysis is therefore problematic.
identification of a population structure refers to the analysis of whether clusters of
different loci appear in the same location of other population groups.

235

Various

studies have purported to find genetic clusters for Africa, Europe, Western Asia, East

225See

id.

226Id.

227
Id.at 27.
228Pilar Ossorio & Troy Duster, Race and Genetics: Controversies in Biomedical, Behavioral, and
Forensic Sciences, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 115, 116 (2005); Madrigal & Barbujani, supra note 224, at
21-22 (citing genetic studies).
229Ossorio & Duster, supra note 228 (citing genetic studies).
230See Madrigal & Barbujani, supra note 224, at 21-22 (citing studies).
231 See id.
232 Eliot Marshall, DNA Studies Challenge the Meaning ofRace, 282 SCI. 654 (1998)
233Madrigal & Barbujani, supra note 224, at 25 (citing studies).
234 See James H. Mielke & Alan G. Fix, The Confluence of Anthropological Genetics and
AnthropologicalDemography,in ANTHROPOLOGICAL GENETICS, supra note 224, at 112, 122.
131Madrigal & Barbujani, supra note 224, at 25.
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Asia, Oceania, South America and even the Kalash of Pakistan. 236 These findings
have been seized upon as verifying that there are genetically
distinguishable
23 7
population groups that correspond with folk notions of race.
However, such an interpretation is flawed. First, as noted above, it is clear that
genetic variation within the suggested population group of Africa far exceeds the
variation among other continents or other proposed population groups. 23 This fact
led the anthropological geneticists Lorena Madrigal and Guido Barbujani to
conclude that "it is impossible to claim that a discontinuous population structure
with well-identified clusters has emerged so far." 239 Additionally, many of these
studies relied on DNA sampling based on "diverse" population groups that merely
240
reflected folk conceptions of race.
Other population geneticists rely on diagnostic gene variance, rather than clusters
of alleles, to justify the use of race as a viable population structure for the study of
genetic differentiation. Many of these geneticists have conducted studies to show a
difference in frequencies of a specific diagnostic allele (or alleles) among "racial"
groups in the United States; however, such studies have largely been restricted to the
United States context, and thus excluded large global populations and regions that
would contradict the United States view of race. 241 In any event, recent scientific
studies indicate that population groups in the United States, such as Caucasians,
African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Hispanics, are genetically admixed, and
should not be represented as genetically homogeneous and distinct groups.242
The claim by some population geneticists that race is a biologically meaningful
concept is similarly belied by the very malleability of race. An individual may be
regarded as "white" by some observers in the United States, while regarded as
"black" by other American observers. Location and context also matter greatly in
racial categorization, as a person may be deemed to be black according to the social
customs of London, but regarded as white in Sao Paulo. Particularly troublesome is
certain geneticists' claimed ability to identify whether a person fits within the
"Hispanic" racial category on the basis of a DNA sample.
The use of ancestry as a proxy for race in genetic testing is also problematic.
Private genetic testing companies claim the ability to biologically discern race by
utilizing "race-determining genetic markers. 243
Even those genetic ancestry
companies that explicitly state that race is a social construction, nonetheless often
provide the testee with a "certificate of ancestry" that utilizes conventional racial
categories - e.g., Native American. Yet race does not equal ancestry generally or as
measured by genetic ancestry tests. Racial categorization, as discussed throughout
this article, is a complex social process that often depends on such factors as skin
color, language, phenotype, nationality, and performance - in addition to ancestry.
236Id. (citing studies by Rosenberg and Bamshad).
23 7
Id.
238See supra text accompanying notes 232-34.
239Madrigal
240

& Barbujani, supra note 224, at 25.

Id. at 26.
241 Id. at 26-27.

Madrigal and Barbujani explain that studies that adopt a "racial view of human
diversity excludes a few 'pesky' billion people from India, whose classification into racial boxes is
?4roblematic." Id.
2Id. at 31 (collecting studies).
243DNAPrint,supra note
202.
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An individual's genetic profile of ancestry does not always match up to that person's
subjective or objective racial identity. Two genetic studies conducted in 2003 both
found that "people whose skin color is perceived as white can have genetic profiles
indicating that 80% of their recent ancestry is West African, and people whose skin
color is perceived of244as black can have genetic profiles indicative of predominately
European ancestry."
CONCLUSION

There can be a certain allure to assuming that there is a genetic dimension to race.
Race is omnipresent in modem society. Every day we implicitly or explicitly apply
racial labels to others, and every day we are in turn similarly raced. We learn how to
classify others by race from our own culture, as evidenced by the fact that the
racialization process in the United States can at times be quite different than the
racialization process in other countries around the world. It can be easy to perceive
race and racial categorization as being natural, immutable and biologically
determinable. This perception is misleading and wholly inaccurate.
There has long been a counter-movement to accepting the intoxicating logic of
natural and biological races, beginning in earnest with the post-World War II
rejection of biological conceptions of race as illustrated by the UNESCO statement
and the subsequent development of a sociological theory of race. By examining the
historical development of the race concept, modem historical, legal, sociological,
anthropological, biological and genetic authorities have been able to conclusively
determine that race is a mere social and political construct that has no biological
relevance.
Even so, the advent of DNA technology and the study of genetic differentiation
have led many geneticists, criminal prosecutors, and judges to assume that there is in
fact a biological basis for race. However, the assumption that race has a discernable
biological essence misapprehends the nature of race and genetic difference, and runs
counter to a bevy of genetic studies that demonstrate that race is not a biologically
meaningful category.
So why do we continue to see proclamations of scientifically valid tests for race,
and the admission of racial probability estimates into American courts? Race,
unconsciously or not, continues to affect the manner in which contemporary
scientists understand and define genetic difference. Similar to the race scientists of
the nineteenth century, many of today's genetic scientists are affected by their
culture's folk notions about the fixed nature of race. As Professor Caudill points out,
"the history of race science is a reminder that science itself is also a representation,
thus any 'science of difference' will be constructed not only in accordance with
observational and methodological conventions,
but also in accordance with
2 45
institutional, social, and rhetorical conventions.
244 Ossorio & Duster, supra note 228, at 118 (citing Flavia C. Parra et al., Color and Genomic Ancestry

in Brazilians, 100 PRO. OF THE NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCI. 177 (2003); Mark D. Shriver et al., Skin
Pigmentation, biogeopgraphicalancestry and admixture mapping, 112 HUM. GENETICS 387 (2003).
245 David S. Caudill, Race, Science, History and Law, 9 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J.
1, 11
(2003); see also Madrigal & Barbujani, supra note 224, at 31 ("As members of their culture, geneticists,
medical and epidemiological practitioners have learned to classify humans in their own culture-specific
manner... [but] they should not assume that their racial taxonomy is supported by genetic data.").
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The increasing acceptance of DNA science that ascribes a genetic dimension to
race has the potential to legitimize culturally-learned folk conceptions of race as

biologically meaningful, as well as usher in a new era of scientific racism. Many
scientists already warn that new data on genetic racial difference could be cited246in
support of debunked notions of white superiority and non-white inferiority.
Society and the law should hesitate before succumbing to the charm of the espoused
genetic view of race and strive not to repeat the mistakes of the past by
unquestioningly shepherding in a modem era of "race science."

246 Amy Harmon, In DNA Era, New Worries About Prejudice, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11, 2007 ("There are

clear differences between people of different continental ancestries. It's not there yet for things like I.Q.,
but I can see it coming. And it has the potential to spark a new era of racism if we do not start explaining
it better. Nonscientists are already beginning to stitch together highly speculative conclusions about the
historically charged subject of race and intelligence from the new biological data." (quoting Marcus W.
Feldman, Professor of Biological Sciences, Stanford University)); see also id. ("We are living through an
era of the ascendance of biology, and we have to be very careful. We will all be walking a fine line
between using biology and allowing it to be abused." (quoting Henry Louis Gates, Jr.)).

